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THE AESTHETIC OF DANTE 
will be best to  begin with a definition, since the term 
its significance. W e  shall be concerned with it as referring 
to  the conscious expression of a conviction with regard to  
the nature of the process by which the beautiful is appre- 
hended, as it appears in conjunction with an analysis of 
beauty. 
Beauty is, I suppose, in general realized intuitionally-it 
is simply perceived or not perceived. N o t  all of us care to  
analyze the process of the perception of it, few are moved 
or even willing to investigate the results of an analysis with 
a view to constructing a canon of the beautiful or a rule for  
the production and the differentiation of its modes. When 
a question of judgment with regard to  the quality of beauty 
is put forward, we resort commonly to  an explanation, of 
little import as an explanation, t o  the effect that  tastes vary, 
and that the answer to the question is, after all, a matter of 
taste. As the poet 
Shelley, in defending his a r t  against the pessimistic attack 
of Peacock, says, " . . . there is a certain order or  rhythm 
belonging to  each of the . . . classes of mimetic represen- 
tation, from which the hearer and the spectator receive an 
intenser and purer pleasure than from any other ;  the sense 
of an approximation to  this order has been called taste by 
modern writers." In  a word, taste is always a matter of 
cultivation, on the presumption that  there is a high sort of 
IT Esthetic has now such general usage as t o  be complex in 
T o  be sure, it is a matter of taste. 
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taste that constitutes a means of determining a gradation 
of values. T h e  real import of the casual observation is that 
it shows the necessity of a canon or standard. Moreover, 
that  irrational, rule-of-thumb solution of the matter of the 
pleasurable appeal of a work of ar t ,  which relies upon the 
subjective experience alone for  the ascribing of beauty to  
that work, in its operation gives proof that a norm is re- 
quired. I mean that  when the judgments with respect to  a 
poem, a painting, or  a piece of music vary widely (o r  even 
slightly, for  that mat te r ) ,  and the varying opinions are given 
with reference to  a seemingly unexplainable effect upon the 
reader, observer, or hearer of the work, they are  evidence 
that the true basis for  right judgment lies in something 
other than the mere indefinite opinion of the observer; that  
Poe’s views on Milton’s “Paradise Lost,” for instance, are 
not valid simply because in their application there is no 
assurance against the equal validity of opposite results. 
Tennyson gives the whole game away when he concedes that 
“Poetry is like shot silk with many glowing colours, and 
every reader must find his own interpretation according to 
his ability, and according to his sympathy with the poet,” for  
he must then allow the opposite of that which he maintains 
in an early poem about the rough intruder who comes over 
the wall into the exclusive garden of the poet’s mind. In  a 
word, I think we should be convinced that there should be 
some means of ascertaining why one opinion of an artistic 
production is not considerable, why another should be rec- 
ognized. 
I must not be interpreted as implying that our aim should 
be to  make objective every element concerned with beauty 
and the beautiful, that  we must find a way of taking it apart  
and measuring all the parts and being quite satisfied with 
the tabulation of a set of qualities and quantities; for this, 
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the commonest, most obvious view of the nature of beauty, 
is most unsatisfactory. It smacks of foot-rules and acid 
tests, which a t  least do not rhyme well. But I would imply 
that there are certain qualities and quantities which are in- 
volved in that which is beautiful and which can be tabulated 
-such as symmetry, sweetness, order, and the like-and 
that the remaining subjective element, if there be one truly, 
is capable of such manipulation that it can at least be cir- 
cumscribed. I shall be interested in having indicated, as 
well, that the objective elements derive their significance 
from the manner in which they are correlated with the 
other. 
I t  may be that I am already exhausting you and myself 
with a sort of violent shadow boxing: but it is my impres- 
sion that there is an opponent of considerable weight some- 
where in the distance. 
T h e  entire difficulty is resolved, I think, if for the present 
we set over against one another two terms which, in the 
content we assign to  each, will stand opposed, and together 
compass the entire field of discussion; these terms are emo- 
tional analysis and rational or intellectual analysis, and, of 
course, the consequent syntheses. And since we are pri- 
marily concerned with poetry as a beautiful expression of 
an impression of beauty, let us be content here to illustrate 
these terms by a consideration of two poets, Keats and 
Dante, as embodying them in their poetry, assuming, as I 
think may be shown, that they are applicable to the other 
arts. W e  shall leave out of consideration entirely that view 
which regards a pleasurable resultant sensation, of what- 
ever sort it may be, as the only requirement of a work of art. 
In  all considerable artists we find some attempt to  express, 
in all considerable poets an attempt to  utter, what they re- 
gard as the true merits, confines, and functions of their arts. 
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Keats’ suavity, appealing to the ear and the mind as vel- 
vet or plush to  the hand or a brocade of figured gold to  the 
eye, is well instanced in his utterances on beauty, which also 
show forth what I would have understood as emotional 
analysis, In  one of the most commonly quoted passages of 
his works, the inscription on the Grecian Urn ,  and the poet’s 
observation with regard to  it, he writes : 
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,”-that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
I notice the suavity of the expression, and the sweeping 
generality as most obvious and most agreeable. But the 
slightest further rationalization makes clear the character- 
istic mode of analysis of Keats. I ask for a delimitation of 
the concept of truth, and am confronted with a dilemma. If 
truth be nothing except “what is,” then all is beautiful, and 
there is no place for the ugly. If it be in its essence the cor- 
respondence between an object and the perception of it, I 
have the most indefinite notion of beauty possible-that of 
a mere juxtaposition of a stimulus and an emotion. T o  be 
sure, if  truth is to  bear all of its interpretations, the lines 
are a n  adequate analysis. T h e  poet speaks of “lily truth,” 
the “very white of truth,” in exactly the same manner as 
that in which he deals with beauty. I am incapable of in- 
tegrating between two such variable points. True,  in his 
letter to Bailey (November 22, 1 8 1 7 )  he writes: “I am 
certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart’s affec- 
tions, and the truth of Imagination. W h a t  the Imagination 
seizes as Beauty must be truth,-whether it existed before or 
not,-for I have the same idea of all our passions as of 
Love: they are all, in their sublime, creative of essential 
Beauty.” But here, too, there is at least a failure to  ob- 
jectify. 
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Either of the conclusions I have mentioned illustrates 
what I have called emotional analysis, which has the pe- 
culiar property of being a mere naming of a condition. This  
sort  of observation is, as I have suggested, characteristic of 
this poet;  for him beauty is “felt” as “keen,” “intense,” 
( 6  strange,” sometimes “staid,” “ever increasing,” eternal, 
with the function existing as it does in particular things with 
indefinite pleasurable associations, of generally soothing any 
irritation, supposedly either by making the irritation vague 
by a contribution of its own vagueness, by disseminating 
itself and thus becoming preponderant, or by some such 
means destroying its opposite. 
Another well known passage illustrates this well : 
A thing of beauty is a joy for ever: 
I ts  loveliness increases ; it will never 
Pass into nothingness; but still will keep 
A bower quiet for us, and a sleep 
Full  of sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing. 
Therefore, on every morrow, are we wreathing 
A flowery band to bind us to the earth, 
Spite of despondence, of the inhuman dearth 
Of noble natures, of the gloomy days, 
Of all the unhealthy and o’er-darken’d ways 
Made  for our searching: yes, in spite of all, 
Some shape of beauty moves away the pall 
From our dark spirits. Such the sun, the moon, 
Trees  old and young, sprouting a shady boon 
For simple sheep; and such are daffodils 
W i t h  the green world they live in ; and clear rills 
T h a t  for themselves a cooling covert make 
’Gainst the hot season ; the mid-forest brake, 
Rich with a sprinkling of fair musk-rose blooms: 
And such too is the grandeur of the dooms 
W e  have imagined for the mighty dead ; 
All lovely tales that we have heard or read: 
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An endless fountain of immortal drink, 
Pouring unto us from the heaven’s brink. 
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Nor do we merely feel these essences 
For  one short hour;  no, even as the trees 
T h a t  whisper round a temple become soon 
Dear as the temple’s self, so does the moon, 
T h e  passion poesy, glories infinite, 
Haunt  us till they become a cheering light 
Unto our souls, and bound to us so fast, 
T h a t ,  whether there be shine, or gloom o’ercast, 
They  always must be with us, or we die. 
All the attributes here ascribed to  beauty are referred to  an 
immediate sensible perception ; there seems to  be no sugges- 
‘tion of the functioning of beauty through an intellectual 
appeal o r  medium. Thus, also, there is apparently no sug- 
gestion of a similar appeal in the poem beginning “I stood 
tiptoe upon a little hill,” in which Keats deals with the in- 
spirational element in nature. There  is, moreover, a hiatus 
between the perception and its result. For  there is obviously 
supposed to be a connection which does not appear;  this 
relation of the essence of the power of fancy, of which 
Keats makes so much, and which has as its peculiar property 
that of joining two elements which have no apparent rela- 
tion, or rather two elements of a series whose interstitial 
steps are omitted. This condition may suggest the sort of 
account common to mystical asthetics, for which there is 
built a system of thought, with gaps in it, which are bridged 
with undemonstrable assumptions, in turn given the name of 
inspiration or revelation; or of that account in which there 
is assumed a metaphorical correspondence, which is built 
into a logically resultant system. I shall call attention to  
instances of this procedure. But I must here add that con- 
comitant with it, as in Keats, there is also an inadequate 
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statement of the nature of the artistic process. Keats seems 
to  have no definite rational expression of the nature of his 
own activity. Poetry-making is the result of “the passion 
poesy.” Certainly there is nothing here comparable to the 
analysis, so incomprehensible to  Byron as to  be satirized by 
him, of Coleridge. But d o  not allow me to  seem to malign 
Keats; before he died he had written that 
fancy cannot cheat so well 
As she is famed to do, 
and had called the heavenly bodies 
symbols divine, 
Manifestations of that beauteous life 
Diffused unseen throughout eternal space. 
I might point in passing to  the inclusive utterance of 
Coleridge as showing a contrasting view. I t  is his opinion 
that ‘(TO admire on principle, is the only way to  imitate 
without loss of originality.” This  holds particularly for 
the poet. 
Since my chief point in contrasting Keats with Dante lies 
in the comparison of a pleasant vagueness with a pleasant 
incisiveness, it will be necessary to  derive the aesthetic value 
of this precision. I shall recall the most remarkable fea- 
tures of aesthetic to and during the time of Dante. 
I n  the thirteenth century there were current various ideas 
of asthetic, more or less abstract, simple or complex; re- 
markable were those of the last sort, and it is these that are 
significant for us. 
Investigation has shown, for instance, that a tradition of 
the Aristotelian differentiation of tragedy and comedy was 
maintained through the Middle Ages, though the treatise in 
which it was made is commonly supposed to have been un- 
known to scholars in that period, with the exception of a 
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very few, so few, perhaps, that the dissemination of the idea 
was not f rom the text. I n  any case, since the likelihood is 
not in the direction of the use of the text of the Poetics, the 
labor which would otherwise be unnecessary (and it is very 
considerable), that  of identifying evidences of the tradition, 
is required. A part  of this work has been done by M r .  
J. P. McMahon, a t  Harvard  University; but it would seem 
that something may still be done. 
Most  striking in the doctrine of the master of those who 
know is the attempt to  represent the artistic process with 
relation both to  the technique and to the function of the a r t ;  
Aristotle would construct his formula in such a way that  it 
may represent at the same time the relation of the poet t o  
his poem, or  of the painter to  his picture, and of the poem 
to the hearer or the picture to  the observer. T h e  poem or  
picture is simply a bearer between artist and audience. T h e  
problems of the artist are therefore two. H e  must first 
appreciate the nature of that  which is pleasurable, and then 
devise a method for  the organization of a piece of work 
which will communicate the pleasurable effect. Fo r  that  
philosopher the pleasure in each case derives from the ap- 
preciation of the esthesis  or  significant perception of the 
selective synthesis or method, on the par t  of the artist, and 
of the degree of aptitude with which the selection is syn- 
thetized, on the par t  of the audience. T h a t  is, the trage- 
dian, for  instance, will choose a series of incidents which 
will cohere in such a way that when arranged in their natu- 
ral  (i.e., probable) order, they constitute an organism 
which by its probable nature immediately leads the attention 
of the observer along its own path in unquestioning sym- 
pathy, to such a degree that he has produced within him 
the emotion which would be produced were he to  undergo 
the stress of action which is represented before him on the 
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stage. This phenomenon has had applied to it the term 
6 L  generalizing power,’) and has given rise, even in Aristotle, 
t o  an emphasis upon the typical as the essential subject for  
artistic representation. W e  still invoke the consideration of 
types as one of the criteria in our own dramatic criticism, 
not always with a full appreciation of the ancient signifi- 
cance, and we shall see that a similar consideration bears 
weight in Dante’s mthetic. 
But Aristotle called the phenomenon, the artistic process, 
imitation. Imitation, however, is not mere reproduction in 
whatever medium of a series of perceptions; a painter will 
not represent every minute detail from nature, but will 
select, though every detail is eligible for  representation, 
only such elements as adequately represent the unity which 
he sees in the subject. I t  is a process of pruning away de- 
fects, which are simply the unnecessary elements-he per- 
forms what Aristotle calls a purgation; and the pleasurable 
result of the process on the person viewing the composition 
comes about from an unconscious, reflex purgation, the 
obverse of that of the artist. H e  is naturally imitative, in 
the ordinary sense of the word, and is therefore led, if the 
a r t  is perfect, involuntarily to the predetermined emotion. 
T h e  pleasure of the emotion arises from the freeing of the 
perceptions of conflicting emotions ; the impression of beauty 
is derived from the contemplation of the purification or  
refining brought about. Every a r t  and every artist pro- 
ceeds in exactly the same manner, and is diversified by the 
medium-the canvas, the limitations of the stage, the 
adequacy of verbal or  mimic (of the body) expression, or  
the instrument or  substance employed. 
T h e  less complex forms of representation afford pastime 
pleasure; the more complex a noble enjoyment that is capa- 
ble of repeated stimulation. 
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Now, it is the imagination which functions when the poet 
makes his selection, and the same faculty which operates 
when the reader considers the poem. I t  has the power of 
forming images from recollected perceptions or of receiving 
the images of present ones and of combining the elements t o  
form an image. Thus the imagination would enable the 
spectator to conceive of the entire action of a play, and of 
the play as an organism, by retaining the events in their 
order as a complete image. Further, the faculty has some 
limited use of the activity of the intellect, though its limita- 
tion is indeterminate. (But it is likely that Aristotle would 
have allowed the imagination as realizing such combinations 
of perceptions as are natural and probable in that they are 
most common.) I t  deals, however, with the appearance of 
things as they are perceived by the senses. For Aristotle 
these are refined in the process of selection, or imitation. It 
may not be inapposite to note that the word imagination 
does not appear in the poetical works of Keats. 
For  Plato, though, the imitation does not involve the 
notion of selection o r  arrangement of conscious origin, but 
is a matter of reproducing by a sort of reflection. Now 
since the senses are notably unreliable, it is evident that  
man has not through them any means of deriving the type; 
the induction of the seed-concept, the essence o r  idea of 
anything will never be complete. M a n  has about him such 
a disparate arrangement of things that, though there is 
evidence of an order leading to  unity, that unity cannot be 
realized in terms of them. T h e  well known passage in the 
“Republic” about the construction of an ideal bed, invoked 
by Bosanquet in his “History of Esthetics,” is sufficient as a 
citation. There  can be no truthful representation by means 
of art, then, and art  is incapable of the moral import which 
it should have. Even a rational effort cannot complete such 
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a synthesis as is necessary for  the adequate expression of 
the idea, the principle, o r  master element of the supernal 
artist. I should like to  speculate upon the notion that the 
doctrine of Plato was issued as a defense against contem- 
porary attack, and suggest that  that  difference between the 
Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines is not really to  be so 
much emphasized. But it is sufficient t o  note that it is the 
Platonic doctrine as we have it that had the influence with 
which we are concerned. 
T h e  Neoplatonic conception may be suggested briefly, 
for  the present purpose, in connection with the Platonic. So 
far  as the artistic process is concerned, it is a matter of the 
artist preparing himself for  the reception of the divine idea, 
unattainable by any intellectual effort, by freeing himself of 
all the checks of sense perception, in order that  the divine 
concept may enter his mind, and waiting for  its entrance. 
T h e  reverse of this process, the expression of that  which is 
instilled, is also limited, since the divinely pure element can- 
not be represented adequately in terms of sense perceptions. 
T h e  qualities of the beautiful, in accordance with this state 
of affairs, must be determined by implication. T h e  one must 
be beautiful, good, pure, bright, because these qualities seem 
to  be indications of the best. And because they coexist in 
the one, they are the same, and the beautiful is good, pure, 
and luminous. I do not give further attention to the doc- 
trine here, for  it will appear again. 
W e  must add to  these three schools or  tendencies current 
in large par t  in the Middle Ages that of Augustine. Fo r  
Augustine the aim of endeavor seems to  be quiescence, 
which is pleasant. T h e  means of attaining this desired re- 
pose is apparently a fusion of the processes already indi- 
cated. Undoubtedly the book on the “Beautiful and the 
Fitting,” which he reports that he destroyed, would have 
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contained such passages as the following: “To be, is no 
other than to  be one. I n  as far,  therefore, as anything 
attains unity, in so f a r  it ‘is.’ For unity worketh congruity 
and harmony, whereby things are composite, in so fa r  as 
they a re :  for things uncompounded are in themselves, be- 
cause they are one; but things compounded, imitate unity 
by the harmony of their parts, and, so fa r  as they attain to  
unity, they are. Wherefore order and rule secure being, 
disorder tends to  not-being.” These observations apply 
also to the existence of beauty. Thus, “ . . . a body which 
consists of members, all of which are beautiful, is by f a r  
more beautiful than the several members individually are by 
whose well-ordered union the whole is completed, though 
these members also be severally beautiful.” Again, “ W e  
shall, therefore, see H i m  according to the measure in which 
we be like H i m ;  because now the measure in which we do  
not see H i m  is according to  the measure of our likeness to  
Him.” I need not stop to  point out hints of Platonic, Aris- 
totelian, and Neoplatonic elements. But it must be added 
that Augustine is remembered by such people as Albertus 
Magnus as having been of the opinion that one of the most 
essential determinants of beauty is color. I suppose we 
should note in his utterances a tendency to  the objectifying 
of which I have spoken, so f a r  as earthly beauty is con- 
cerned, and so f a r  as essential beauty is concerned, a ten- 
dency toward the Platonic notion. 
I must arrive a t  the most definite utterance on the beauti- 
ful known to  the Middle Ages, and pass by some slighter 
ones. This  is found in a short work ascribed to  St. Thomas  
Aquinas (though it is perhaps by his teacher, Albertus), 
called “De Pulchro et Bono,” or, “Of the Beautiful and 
the Good.” T h e  treatise consists of an excerpt from the 
work “On the Divine Names,” assigned to Dionysius the 
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Areopagite by medieval scholars, together with an exposi- 
tion of it, point by point, after the fashion of the medieval 
tractate proper. I shall attempt to summarize its doctrine 
as briefly as possible. T o  the Deity is assigned the quality 
of beauty. H e  is the One, the Perfect in every respect. 
From Him, in H i s  quality as creator, come all the qualities 
with which we are conversant, which must, of course, have 
some intermediary bearers for  the purpose of dissemination. 
These bearers are the heavenly bodies, in something like the 
order in which the spheres of the universe were thought to  
be arranged. Each has, however, the function of transmit- 
ting to  the next lower the divine effluences, dividing them 
as they arrive at  each amongst those next in order below 
themselves. There  is thus an universal dissemination. 
Each object receives the disseminated power as its par- 
ticular order and adaptability will allow, and ultimately 
earthly things take something of the divine quality, express- 
ing it in such qualities as appear to  men as sensible ones. 
Now beauty is, of course, one of these. I n  objects we per- 
ceive color, figure, arrangement of parts, symmetry, and the 
like. Similarly we perceive light transmitted from one 
heavenly body to  another, and finally to  us. Likewise, the 
quality of good, which proceeds from the same source and 
is lodged in particular things, is perceived by us. Since it 
proceeds from the same source, in which it is identified with 
it, the good is t o  be associated with the beautiful. So, in 
the same way that evil is simply an absence of good, the 
ugly is a negation of the beautiful. A deformed body is 
ugly because it does not contain that share of the emanation 
of beauty which it could have received if the arrangement 
of its parts were such as to  be capable of receiving it. T h e  
arrangement of the parts is a sort of potential beauty, and 
in the treatise the proportionate, harmonic ordering of the 
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elements of any complex is pointed to  as the principal con- 
sideration of mundane pulchritude. In addition to  beauty 
and goodness, the Deity possesses the swiftest of motion. 
This, too, is transmitted; a beauty of motion is thus con- 
ceivable. 
T h e  human mind is aware of any one of these modes of 
beauty by means of the perceptions which enter it through 
the senses. I t  has, of course, the power of discretion, which 
operates in such a way that it discerns o r  distinguishes 
beauty from the lack of i t ;  there is also an imaging fac- 
ulty, which presents to  the conscious mind the result of the 
selection. There  is possible, within limitations, a selection 
of the imagings, so that there develops a higher and higher 
appreciation of beauty. Although the account is carried on 
in more or less figurative language, it will be observed that 
there are here present suggestions of an Aristotelian selec- 
tion, and a Platonic o r  rather Neoplatonic hierarchy of 
subjects for selection, with an intermingling of Augustinian 
attention to color. 
There  is one other notion, that of the differentiation of 
the beautiful and the becoming o r  decorous, which is set 
down as the contribution of Cicero to aesthetic. I t  will be 
found best expressed in the following passage from the 
treatise, in which are suggested the elements to which I have 
alluded, together with a further differentiation of grace from 
beauty and the becoming o r  fitting. 
. . , the beautiful includes many things in its modes: there is 
obvious the splendor of substantial or  actual form upon proportioned 
and limited parts of matter, as a body is called beautiful on account 
of the resplendence of color upon proportioned members: this is a sort 
of specific difference satisfying the mode of the beautiful. A second is 
that it draws desire to itself, and this power it has in so far as it is a 
good and an end. A third is that it gathers all things together, and 
this it has from the part of its form whose resplendence makes it beau- 
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tiful. Therefore so far as the first is concerned, the mode of the 
beautiful is distinguished from that of the becoming and the good; 
however, with respect to the second, they are not distinguished in any 
way, because that approaches the beautiful according as i t  is the same 
subject in which the good is; but with regard to the third, there is a 
certain fitness in the matter of the subject, because it approaches both 
the beautiful and the good as it is of the form of either. For all 
cognition has reference to form, which is the determinant of the mul- 
tiplicity of the powers of matter;  but it differs in mode, because as 
form is the end of matter, so the good assumes the mode of uniting. 
But as it is resplendent upon the parts of matter, so the beautiful has 
the mode of uniting (or  assembling). So we therefore say that the 
beautiful and the becoming are the same in subject ; but they are dif- 
ferent in mode, for the mode of the beautiful in general consists in a 
resplendence of form upon proportioned parts of matter, or upon 
divers men or actions; but the mode of the becoming consists in this, 
that it draws desire to itself; grace (decus) ,  however, is spoken of as 
proportion of power to the act. 
I should remark, perhaps, that  the only suggestion of the 
artistic process is in the words “all cognition has reference 
to form, which is the determinant of the multiplicity of the 
powers of matter,  so the good receives the mode of uniting. 
But as it is resplendent upon the parts of matter, so the 
beautiful has the mode of uniting.” I should judge, on not- 
ing the Aristotelian language and allusion, that the imagina- 
tive faculty is in question, and that it functions, as I have 
suggested, by joining perceptions. It is essential t o  note 
that it reproduces the form or  “determinant of the multi- 
plicity of the powers of matter,” that  is, that  no artistic 
ordering is presented through its own power of ordering. 
T h e  selective process which is the property of the artist for  
Aristotle seems here to  be taken care of by the Supreme 
Being, and the poet, we would presume, becomes but an- 
other bearer of the divine effluence. 
Assuming that I have sufficiently indicated the progress 
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of the precision of analysis of the esthetic activity, which I 
set out to  derive, I may, therefore, proceed immediately to  
point out the incisiveness of Dante’s analysis with reference 
to  what has been said. 
There  is in the poet’s works a marked prominence given 
to  the idea of division, in the use of the word or of words 
signifying the act. To discern means to  Dante to  make a 
definite differentiation of parts a t  natural points of division. 
There  are indications that division is the first step of the 
process of the artistic method. Throughout the “Vita 
Nuova,” the poems are divided for  the avowed purpose of 
facilitating the understanding of them. There  is, inciden- 
tally, a passage in a work of Hugo of St. Victor undoubt- 
edly known to the poet, which ascribes to  division the same 
value. Of course, mere division does not offer the highest 
degree of interpretation; it is simply the basis for  it. T h e  
next natural step is one toward combination of the things 
separated. It is worth while bearing in mind this process of 
division in interpreting lines 8-9 of the first of the “In- 
ferno,” ‘‘ . . . to  treat of the good which I found there, I 
shall tell of the other things which there I saw.” There is 
here a conception of the suggestion of one thing by its op- 
posite, which occurs in a number of medieval writings, with 
the presupposition that they are differentiated. Essentially, 
the division takes place a t  the same time as does the com- 
position. Thus,  “The fairest branch that  springs from the 
root of reason is discernment. For ,  as Thomas says, . . . T o  
know the coordination of one thing with another is a special 
act of the reason, and this is discernment.’ One of the fair- 
est and sweetest fruits of this branch is the reverence which 
the lesser owes to the greater. Whence Tully, . . . , speak- 
ing of the beauty which shines in the face of rectitude, says 
that reverence is a par t  of this beauty.” 
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T h e  discernment of coordination, though, which is the 
result of the activity of the reason, is not final. There  are 
special agents which lead the mind to  a further realization 
of the organization: the one making possible a limited ap- 
preciation of organization by the intellect, the other seem- 
ing to represent it completely. Thus Dante writes, “ . . . I 
say that our intellect for lack of that virtue by which it draws 
to  itself that which it perceives [I mean an organic virtue, 
namely, the fancy] cannot rise to certain things because the 
fancy cannot help it, as it has not wherewithal. Such, for 
example, are substances separate from matter, which, al- 
though we may to  some extent speculate about them, we 
cannot understand perfectly. And for this man is not to  be 
blamed, for he was not the author of this defect; rather was 
it universal nature that so ordained, that is God, who willed 
to deprive us of this light during this present life; and why 
H e  so ordained it would be presumptuous for us to  discuss. 
So that if my speculation carried me away to  a region where 
the imagination lagged behind the intellect, though I cannot 
understand I am not therefore to  be blamed. Furthermore, 
a limit is set to our ability in all its operations not by our- 
selves but by universal nature, and therefore we must know 
that the bounds of our capacity give wider range for speech 
than for the language. Therefore, i f  our thought, not only 
such thought as does not arrive a t  perfect understanding, 
but even that which culminates in perfect understanding, is 
too strong for  words, we are not to  blame, since we are not 
the authors of this defect.” Certainly this passage illumi- 
nates that a t  the beginning of the “Paradiso,” in which the 
reader who has not understood so f a r  is warned to  leave 
off, for he surely will be unable to  understand beyond that 
point; and, again, explains those several observations scat- 
tered through the last cantos of the “Paradiso”’ in which 
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the poet confesses himself unable to  represent the fulness of 
his vision in words. T h e  secondary agent of the organizing 
function is the imagination. Of his state a t  beholding the 
Virgin he says, “I saw there smile upon their sporting and 
upon their chanting a beauty such that there was joy among 
the other Saints. And though I had wealth of speech even 
as of imagining I should not hazard to show the least part  
of their delight.” Here ,  too, the other faculty fails; but it 
is to be expected that the failure of speech would occur in 
either case. There  is not lacking, however, the ability to  
address to  the intellect the organization of earthly beauty. 
T h e  imagination is able to  perceive even an abstraction of 
beauty. “Men say that a thing is beautiful when its parts 
correspond as they ought, because pleasure results from 
their harmony. Hence a man appears beautiful when his 
limbs correspond to  one another as they ought; and we say 
that a song is beautiful when its words correspond to  one 
another according to  the requirements.” Here  is beauty as 
the harmonious congruence of parts. H e r e  that of the apt, 
suitable, becoming: (‘ . . . we should not describe an ox 
with trappings or a swine with a belt as adorned, nay rather 
we laugh a t  them as disfigured; for adornment is the addi- 
tion of some suitable thing.” 
Here  is a case in which beauty is not the same as goodness, 
but even so one of the sort just mentioned. In the discussion 
of a beautiful canzone, whose reading may not reach every 
reader, be says, “I say in the present instance that the good- 
ness and beauty of every discourse are separate and diverse 
from one another, for  goodness resides in the meaning and 
beauty in the adornment of the language, and both one and 
the other are attended with delight, although goodness be 
in the highest degree delightful. Wherefore, inasmuch as 
the goodness of this Canzone was difficult to apprehend on 
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account of the diversity of persons who are introduced in it 
as speakers, so that many distinctions are needed, while its 
beauty was easily seen, this Canzone seemed to require that 
fo r  people generally, attention should be fixed on its beauty 
rather than its goodness.” 
But beauty and goodness are to  be related finally: 
( 6  . . . Morality is the beauty of philosophy, for  as the 
beauty of the body follows from the proper disposition of 
the members, so the beauty of wisdom which is the body of 
philosophy, . . . , follows from the disposition of the moral 
virtues which enable her to  give pleasure perceptibly to  the 
senses,” Furthermore, (‘ , . . the beauty of the soul consists 
of manners, that  is to say, in the virtues most of all, which 
sometimes through vanity or  pride are rendered less beauti- 
ful and less pleasing.’’ 
T h e  asthetic process for Dante, then, consists of the 
appreciation of what is beautiful, of whatever sort it may 
be, through the agency of the imagination. Ar t  must con- 
sist of an expression of an impression; and with regard to  
this the recurrence of the well known figure of the stamp 
and the wax is evidence of an Aristotelian tradition. There  
are three matters for  concern in consideration of art ,  which 
are suggested by the poet thus: “Be it known then that like 
as a r t  exists in three grades-in the mind of the artificer, 
in the instrument, and in the material informed by art-so 
too we may regard nature in three grades. Fo r  nature is in 
the mind of the first mover, which is God, and further in 
the heaven as  the instrument by means of which the like- 
ness of the eternal excellence is spread over fluctuating mat- 
ter. And as when the artificer is perfect and the instrument 
is in perfect order, any flaw that may occur in the form of 
a r t  must be imputed to  the material alone, so, since God 
realizes the supreme perfection, and his instrument, the 
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heaven, falls no way short of its due perfection-it remains 
that  whatsoever flaw there is in things below is a flaw on the 
part  of the material submitted to  the action of God and the 
heaven, and is beside the intention both of God as the active 
principle of nature, and of the heaven; and whatsoever good 
there is in things below, since it cannot come from the mat- 
ter itself, which only exists as potentiality, must come from 
the artificer, God, and secondarily from heaven, which is the 
instrument of that  divine a r t  which men call nature.” 
T h e  poet will look about him, allow his imaginative fac- 
ulty to  work, and reproduce what close approximation he 
can of the artistic order which he derives. T h e  practice 
becomes habitual, and, as a result, the definition of a r t  
which Aristotle formulates is here valid, t o  the effect that it 
is a habit of production in conscious accord with the correct 
method. 
An instance of the poet’s practice may illustrate better. 
H e  writes that  “in works of ar t ,  that  is noblest which em- 
braces the whole art. Since, therefore, poems are works of 
art ,  and the whole of the ar t  is embraced in canzoni alone, 
canzoni are the noblest poems, and so their form is the 
noblest of any.” “The whole art ,  therefore, of the canzone 
appears to  depend on three things: first, on the division of 
the musical setting; second, on the arrangement of the 
There  is a particular form of this sort  of poem that shows 
the following of a peculiar “habit”; it is in the canzone re- 
garded as a tractate. A number of Dante’s canzoni are  
referred to by this name, and these, with a few others, ex- 
hibit characteristics fairly determinate. I t  is noted by 
Toynbee that  this sort of poem has a proem, a body, and a 
conclusion; that  the body of the poem is made up of a nar- 
rative, and is sometimes referred to  as the narrative por- 
par ts ;  third, on the number of the lines and syllables. , . . ,, 
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tion, o r  of some expository treatment. I t  seems, further, 
that this body of the poem has in several cases a special 
significance so f a r  as the form is concerned. There  is in a 
work of Hugo of St. Victor a definition of the tractate that 
has so far,  apparently, been missed by commentators, ac- 
cording to  which this form of writing is a “multiple exposi- 
tion of a single thing.” Now it is obvious that many of the 
songs consist of just this; moreover, the poet hints that  this 
is so. I t  is true in the case of the poem which appears a t  the 
beginning of the second tractate of the “Convivio.” Some 
such notion as is given in Hugo’s definition appears to be at 
the bottom of the application of the term to the canzone; it 
is also applied, seemingly in this meaning, to the “Vita 
Nuova” and the “Comedy.” There  is, then, in such a phe- 
nomenon evidence of a close study of poetic forms and their 
suitable use, and a decided acumen in the poet’s adaptation 
of them. 
Dante has been shown to  have been to  some degree an 
astronomer; it will appear that  he was a philosopher and 
economist as well as literary artist. I cannot overemphasize 
the opinion that in the light of his works, in that of their 
content and the evidence of the most pronounced concern of 
the poet with regard to  their purposive construction, which 
is intended to  lead to  a noble enjoyment on the part  of the 
reader, his Esthetic is noteworthy and significant; and that 
in the same manner and to the same degree that Spenser is 
the poet’s poet, he may be called the philosopher’s and the 
artist’s poet. 
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